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Democracy is difficult to define. This is in part due to the fact that the word
has almost become an automatic way of denoting a correct or acceptable
form of national governance. Most governments and political systems profess
to be democratic although whether they are often remains a hotly debated
issue, making it clear that any limited set of conditions prescribing truly
democratic governance may be defeated by counterexamples. Universal suf-
frage will not suffice if political opposition is systematically suppressed or
citizens do not practically have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote.
The constitutional separation of powers and various checks and balances will
not equal “democracy” unless their operation serves the central aspirations of
democratic societies, such as accountability, legitimacy and the basic goods of
freedom and relative equality. Democracy, in a word, is an ideal rather than
an actual state of affairs already attained; accordingly, philosophical accounts
of democracy mostly outline ways in which our systems of governance should
be designed, implemented and participated in, rather than describing the
operations of any actual state or jurisdiction.
By and large, contemporary philosophical accounts of democracy address
three types of issues. The first pertains to the justification, preferability and
legitimacy of a democratic form of governance. Is democracy better than its
alternatives, and is it so to everyone? What do we say to those who would
rather be subject to a non-democratic form of governance? A second issue
concerns the nature of democratic citizenship and the extent to which citizens
can be expected to make informed choices when participating in public
processes. This issue is especially pertinent when philosophers claim that
decisions made by way of a democratic procedure are better than those pro-
duced by alternative systems of governance. Finally, a third set of issues con-
cerns the setup of a democratic society. Here the questions concern the
procedures, constitution and institutions that a democratic society should
entail, as well as the nature of citizen representation in processes of decision-
making, including different forms of direct and representational democratic
settings.
Many philosophers have proposed that the tradition of philosophical prag-
matism offers a unique perspective on democracy and the role of citizens. In
what follows, I discuss one pragmatist view of democracy and democratic
citizenship that is grounded in John Dewey’s view of social inquiry, contrast-
ing it with two alternative visions of democracy. The first of these alternatives,
sometimes critically dubbed élitist democracy, views democracy as a compe-
tition between political and expert élites representing citizens in the political
process; here, the central democratic practice of citizens is voting in recurring
elections. The second vision is deliberative democracy, where citizens are
expected to engage in rational discourse and arrive at a reasoned consensus as
to the best decisions. Instead of voting, the central practice is participation in
the form of public deliberation. Although pragmatist views have been likened
to and identified with the deliberative account, I argue that key differences in
the two perspectives have largely been overlooked. The pragmatist approach
to democracy as social inquiry is not equivalent to deliberation. However, as I
point out, this difference entails that the pragmatist must give an account of
why such inquiry should be understood as democratic; in particular, the
pragmatist must address and explain the role of citizens in its practice.
Élitism, deliberative democracy and pragmatism
As a descriptive term, and very broadly speaking, democracy means equality
in group decision-making: everyone has an equal chance to influence a deci-
sion affecting the group, at least at some point or juncture. Central to the
development of contemporary Western democracy is the family of views in
political philosophy often lumped together as liberal democracy. These views
emphasize the rights and freedoms of individuals, which the state is expected
both to respect and uphold, and equality among individuals with respect to
these rights. However, in Western democracies, decisions are made by expert-
informed political élites, and citizen participation is largely limited to the
selection of representatives by voting in recurring elections. Joseph Schump-
eter famously codified this élitist form of democracy as the “institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
(1950, 269). In this view, democracy is the marketplace for competing groups
of political professionals and experts, and the main – or only – role for citi-
zens is to vote in elections where the successes and failures of political leaders
are assessed. The connection between political decision-making and the citi-
zen is representation, and the central democratic practice is voting (see Held
1987; Whipple 2005).
In part as a reaction to such élitism, proponents of a deliberative view of
democracy demand the participation of citizens rather than their mere repre-
sentation by experts. The background of deliberative democracy is a central
concern of the liberal tradition: the legitimacy of governments and the use of
state power, which – beginning with John Locke (1689/1988) – liberals have
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usually predicated on the acceptability of the government or its decisions to
the governed individual or citizen. This notion of legitimacy influenced the
work of John Rawls who, in A Theory of Justice (1971/1999), aspired to lay
the foundations of a democratic society in basic principles which would be
(rationally) acceptable to all citizens, despite their differing interests and
incompatible beliefs. Rawls’s work sparked renewed interest in political phi-
losophy, including an industry of criticism of the Rawlsian project, such as the
so-called communitarian critiques (e.g. Walzer 1983) and less consensus-
oriented views of democracy (e.g. Mouffe 2013).
The concern with legitimacy, as well as Rawls’s arguments that some prin-
ciples are acceptable to all “reasonable” citizens, inspired a new under-
standing of the central processes of democratic decision-making and the role
of citizens. Together with increasing demands for public participation in
political decision-making, contemporary thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas
(1990), Rawls (1996) and Joshua Cohen (1989) proposed that the legitimacy
or justification of political decisions depends on their acceptability to all
(reasonable) citizens. According to these views, democracy is to be viewed as
a deliberative process of public justification. A consensus reached by citizens
after rational, reasoned debate and discussion is required to justify and legit-
imize political decisions. The deliberative perspective provides an easy argu-
ment for democracy: democratic and participatory decision making is needed
because the very forming of correct, justified or legitimate decisions require
democratic procedures and the participation of large groups of citizens.
Democracy just is the procedure by which we can attain justified ethical or
political views. (In broad strokes, this is how the deliberative view answers the
three main issues of contemporary political philosophy concerning
democracy.)
Within this newly conceived debate, pragmatist philosophers began to
argue for the relevance of pragmatism – especially John Dewey’s views – in
political philosophy. Originally a view about the meanings of concepts and
propositions proposed by Charles S. Peirce in the 1870s (Peirce 1877/1992;
1878/1992), pragmatism quickly started to denote a family of diverse views
which emphasized the connection between theory and practice and attempted
to elucidate the notion of truth in terms of inquiry and problem-solving. As
public intellectuals of their day, two of the key classics of the pragmatist tra-
dition, Peirce and William James had also published various pieces discussing
political issues. However, it was Dewey who wrote most extensively on poli-
tical philosophy, and whose views gradually gained prominence in the con-
temporary debate. Pragmatist views have been compared with and likened to
Rawls’s early and later liberalism (of his Political Liberalism, 1996), Haber-
mas’ views of discourse ethics as underlying democratic ideals and various
other forms of deliberative democracy (e.g. Habermas 1990; Bohman 1998;
Misak 2000; Talisse 2007).
Such a likening appears natural. Both contemporary deliberative accounts
and pragmatist views are based on structurally similar considerations
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concerning the virtues of democracy. Rather than arguing for democracy
based on some first-order value – such as equality or freedom – both views
connect democracy with a second-order good which democratic societies,
institutions and decision-making are supposed to secure. Pragmatist views
tend to connect democracy with the pragmatist account of inquiry: they hold
that truth(s) – at least on some issues – can only, or best, be approached
within the context of democracy (or at least some set of democratic institu-
tions and procedures). Deliberative views maintain that the validity, legiti-
macy or correctness of political decisions consists of, or at least depends on,
their being the result of a democratic process or procedure; democracy is
needful not (only) because of its being or securing something of first-order
value, but in the interest of arriving at correct or justified views or valid or
legitimate political decisions. However, as I now argue, there are definite and
important differences in the two accounts.
Social inqugiry
A central starting point of (many) pragmatist views of democracy is the
pragmatist notion of inquiry, or the process of settling opinion. In the prag-
matist account, in its ordinary, everyday version, inquiry begins with doubt,
or what Dewey called a problematic situation: some of our beliefs may be
called into question, and inquiry is enacted to appease this doubt by attaining
a revised or new belief. Scientific inquiry is this process made deliberate; it
aims to continuously revise theories and test hypotheses, even those provi-
sionally accepted by the scientific community. A central contention of the
pragmatists is that such revision extends to the methods and standards of
inquiry itself; our views of justification and criteria for better and worse the-
ories and procedures are themselves the results of these practices and, as such,
themselves fallible and always liable to revision. While any inquiry must rest
on results already attained and (provisionally) accepted, the methods and
theories of science are developed hand in hand, without any a priori guaran-
tees as to their feasibility or correctness.
An important feature of this view of inquiry is that it is not limited to
questions of what there is or, perhaps, would be – the sort of questions that
we usually think science may address. Rather, it extends to normative ques-
tions of what there should be, or what ought to be done (cf. Rydenfelt 2011b;
2015a; 2015b). Critical of any hard dichotomy between descriptive and nor-
mative questions, pragmatists – beginning with Peirce – have argued that both
kinds of issues can be approached with, broadly speaking, similar means,
without reducing normative issues to descriptive or instrumental ones. There
is no principled reason, the pragmatists maintain, why values and norms
could not become the objects of a practice of deliberate revision, or scientific
inquiry.
This extension of scientific inquiry to normative questions Dewey called
social inquiry. He found contemporary social science to be stuck between two
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uneasy alternative approaches to the role of values in inquiry. In the first,
social or societal issues are addressed in terms of blame and approbation
based on preconceived moral views. Social sciences, then, rest on static and
fixed, often unstated and implicit, evaluations due to custom or tradition. In
the second alternative, in order to refrain from “moralising”, evaluations are
superficially excluded from science altogether in line with a strong dichotomy
between “facts” and “values”. Yet this apparent exclusion of evaluations from
social science reduces such inquiry “at its very best to the truncated and dis-
torted business of finding out means for realizing objectives already set upon”
(Dewey 1938, 490). Neither alternative is satisfactory. Both rely on implicit,
unstated goals and evaluations: “the values employed are not determined in
and by the process of inquiry” (1938, 496).
In contrast, in Dewey’s view, our values and aims (or what Dewey calls our
“ends-in-view”) should be treated as hypotheses to be tested by and in the
process of inquiry. This extends to social and societal policy, which Dewey
argues, “is, logically, and should be actually, of the nature of an experiment”:
(1) it [a social policy] represents the adoption of one out of a number of
alternative conceptions as possible plans of action and (2) its execution is
followed by consequences which, while not as capable of definite or
exclusive differentiation as in the case of physical experimentation, are
none the less observable within limits, so they may serve as tests of the
validity of the conception acted upon.
(1938, 502)
In this view, the test of a value (or an end-in-view) takes place in an experi-
ment, which is the actual adoption of social policy. The policy implemented
amounts to the choice of one of a number of alternative courses of action to
address a social problem, and its validity can and should be tested by way of
its consequences in experience.
However, a concern will inevitably be raised. If our values (or ends-in-view)
are tested by their consequences, do we not need another set of values, or
ends, in light of which these consequences are assessed? It appears that
experimentation with social policy can occur only if there are some further,
more final values; this concern is certainly not alleviated by Dewey’s occa-
sional talk of values as “means” (cf. Westbrook 1998). Indeed, Dewey main-
tained that drawing from further values in social inquiry is inevitable; such
inquiry “must judge certain objective consequences to be the end which is
worth attaining under the given conditions” (1938, 496). This dependence on
values, however, does not distinguish social inquiry from other lines of
inquiry. Physical inquiry, Dewey pointed out, also requires values or ends: all
inquiry is a process “of adjudgment, of appraisal or evaluation”, as it
“demands that out of the complex welter of existential and potentially obser-
vable and recordable material, certain material be selected and weighed as
data […]” (1938, 491). Both social and physical inquiry presuppose some view
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of the kind of results of experimentation that speak for or against a hypoth-
esis. Social and physical inquiry are distinguished by their subject matters
and, consequently, by the kind of operations and environments in which
inquiry takes place. Nevertheless, both types of inquiry assume and require
standards of justification (or confirmation or corroboration of a hypothesis by
data). What is more, such standards cannot be settled in advance of such
inquiry, or by means of philosophical, a priori argumentation. Rather, the
standards of justification are themselves explicated, questioned, revised and
determined in the process of physical or social inquiry.
Within social inquiry, what could this revision of standards mean in prac-
tical terms? The central Deweyan idea here is that the data collected within
experimentation with a social policy are not used merely to show how suc-
cessful the policy was in achieving the ends that it was designed to attain. The
same data also speak to the viability of those ends as such: whether the ends
were worthwhile in the first place; what other ends were not achieved; whe-
ther some further ends were suggested only once the policy was in place;
whether the ends that the policy was designed to achieve turned out to be an
aspect of some more encompassing end which should be the goal of social
policy; and so on. The outcomes of the experiment speak not only to the
success of the policy with respect to an initial goal, but more generally to
the issue of what kind of data are taken to corroborate or disconfirm the
hypothesis – that is, to the general issue of what the goals of social policy
should be.
The method of democracy
Dewey’s advocacy of democracy had many motivations, but his view of social
inquiry was certainly one among them. In Liberalism and Social Action
(1935), he aspired to distinguish the contemporary liberal ideals of democracy
from what he called the method of democracy: the extension of “organized
cooperative inquiry” into social issues. The background of this discussion lies
in Dewey’s entrenched criticism of the individualism manifested in classical
liberalism and its view of politics largely as a negotiation between the clashing
interests of different individuals. In the liberal view, intelligence appears as
“an individualistic possession, at best enlarged by public discussion” (1935,
50), “an individual possession to be reached by means of verbal persuasion”
(1935, 51). A vision of democratic society as comprising groups of individuals
represented by political parties or factions is, in Dewey’s view, an extension of
this liberal view of intelligence into public decision-making. The result is a
view of democracy as public discussion, where public “truths” are expected to
emerge from the conflict of individual and group interests. Dewey contrasted
this procedure of arriving at political “truths” with scientific inquiry:
The idea that the conflict of [political] parties will, by means of public
discussion, bring out necessary public truths is a kind of political
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watered-down version of the Hegelian dialectic, with its synthesis arrived
at by a union of antithetical conceptions. The method has nothing in
common with the procedure of organized cooperative inquiry which has
won the triumphs of science in the field of physical nature.
(Dewey 1935, 51)
The notion that discussion suffices for the discovery of physical laws and the
structure of reality was replaced, in physical science, by the method of
“experimental observation guided by comprehensive working hypothesis, and
using all the resources made available by mathematics” (1935, 50). In the
same vein, Dewey proposed that the notion of democracy as a public discus-
sion should be replaced by the method of democracy – that of organized,
cooperative intelligence and experimental inquiry.
Here the contrast between Dewey’s method of democracy and deliberative
accounts of democracy appears particularly stark. Both Dewey and the pro-
ponents of deliberative democracy maintain that democracy should be more
than the “majority rule” of ballot boxes; such procedures of representation
are often inadequate as means for arriving at increasingly better policies. Yet
the deliberative view amounts to advocating just the kind of public discussion
which Dewey admonishes for its incomplete and outdated view of ethical and
political truths.
This difference between the deliberative perspective and the Deweyan
method of democracy points to a divergence in their views of central moti-
vations and aspirations for democracy. The deliberative perspective con-
tributes to an argument for democracy and an account of the role of citizens:
a democratic, deliberative process of decision-making is itself justified – or at
least needful – because the formation of correct, justified or legitimate deci-
sions requires democratic procedures and the participation of large groups of
citizens. Democracy is the procedure by which we can attain justified ethical
or political views. In the Deweyan view, in which the method of democracy is
funded by the notion of social inquiry, the connection between such inquiry
and procedures, organizations, institutions and overall societal settings which
deserve to be called democratic appears less straightforward. If simple
majority rule and the ideal of reasoned public debate is replaced by the
experimental method in the solution of ethical, political and social issues, it is
not clear why the resulting practices of social inquiry amount to the method
of democracy. 1 The central issues of the justification of democracy (or the
legitimacy of democratic decisions), the procedures and institutions of a
functioning democracy and a feasible account of the role of citizens and citi-
zen participation, require a new response.
Many contemporary pragmatist views of democracy have drawn upon the
connection between democracy and (social) inquiry in order to address these
central issues of contemporary political philosophy. This is a natural move to
make. As already pointed out, emphasizing this connection is perhaps the
most distinctive contribution of pragmatism to political philosophy. However,
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as the doubts already presented reveal, the connection is also somewhat deli-
cate. Even if the pragmatist view of social inquiry does underwrite an account
of democracy, it is far from clear what such a democracy entails. To bring this
issue into sharper relief, I now briefly explore the views of contemporary
pragmatists.
The pragmatist argument(s) for democracy
It is doubtful that Dewey – or any of the other classics of pragmatism –
attempted to formulate an argument that would meet the contemporary
challenge of justifying or legitimizing democracy. Dewey’s views of social
inquiry were only a part of his motivation and conception of democracy. He
held that democracy is “more than a form of government; it is primarily a
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey
1916, 93). He proposed a commitment to democracy as a way of life that
should permeate every form and aspect of human association (e.g. Dewey
1927, 325), and viewed democracy as integral to human flourishing or what
he calls “growth”. This commitment to democracy has come at a price:
Dewey’s views in particular have been criticized for creed-like obstinacy (cf.
Talisse 2010), while the connection between democracy and growth – as well
as the concept of growth more generally – has been found obscure (cf. Hil-
dreth 2011). To remedy this situation, contemporary pragmatists have
attempted to formulate arguments that would address present-day concerns
with the justification of democracy based on the writings of the classical
pragmatists, especially Dewey and Peirce.
Among contemporary pragmatists, it appears that the first to explicitly
formulate a pragmatist argument for democracy explicitly is Hilary Putnam
(1992; 1994), who claimed to draw it from Dewey. In Putnam’s version, the
argument has two premises. The first is a pragmatist view of ethical and
political truth already explored: ethical and political truths are (or at least
may be) discoverable in a process of inquiry (e.g. Putnam 1992, 186). Put-
nam’s second premise is that such inquiry requires democratic standards and
ideals in a society. In his view, this latter premise is an empirical claim, which
maintains that a “hierarchical” (that is, non-democratic) society “limits the
rationality of those at both ends of the hierarchy” (Putnam 1994, 175). Hier-
archy “stunts the intellectual growth of the oppressed, and forces the privi-
leged to construct rationalizations to justify their position” (ibid.).
Hierarchical societies, Putnam maintains “do not, in these respects, produce
solutions to value disputes that are rationally acceptable” (ibid.). Thus,
Putnam concludes, we should organize our societies in a democratic fashion,
because that is what successful ethical and political inquiry requires; democ-
racy is – at least to the extent that we desire to promote the growth of human
intelligence and knowledge – preferable to its alternatives.
Other pragmatists have derived further conclusions based on similar pre-
mises. Drawing mainly from Peirce’s notion of inquiry, Robert B. Talisse
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(2007; 2010) has attempted to show that (liberal) democracy is a legitimate
form of governance in the sense advanced by the tradition of political liber-
alism: that democracy is acceptable to all reasonable citizens. If we are inter-
ested in learning the truth concerning any issue, Talisse maintains, we are
already committed to certain conceptions of good evidence, reasons, justifi-
cation and inquiry; moreover, these conceptions are democratic. This account
is indebted to Cheryl Misak’s (2000) defence of democracy, which revolves
around what she calls the pragmatist methodological principle that “the
experience of others must be taken seriously” (Misak 2000, 6). As agents with
beliefs, Misak maintains, we are already seeking the truth; truth is, in a
familiar dictum, the aim of belief. Seeking truth, in turn, means that we are
already committed to a notion of reasons for belief which includes the rele-
vance of the experiences and arguments of various others. If our opinions are
to be settled so as to withstand the experience and argument of potentially
everyone, the views and experiences of all may be relevant to our inquiries.
Everyone thus must have the chance to express their opinion in moral
debates; the methodological principle “requires a democracy in inquiry”
(Misak 2000, 6).
It is doubtful, however, that such arguments can convince those who do not
already share a number of crucial assumptions – for instance, those citizens
who maintain non-democratic views (cf. Rydenfelt 2011a; Rydenfelt in press).
Putnam’s first premise already entails a substantial view of ethical and poli-
tical issues: that we can, and should attempt to, solve them by way of scien-
tific inquiry rather than, say, by simple reliance on tradition or religious
creed. The same ideal of inquiry is also reflected in the second premise. As we
saw, in Putnam’s view, non-democratic societies curtail the rationality of the
citizens at both ends of a hierarchical spectrum, leading to solutions to ethical
problems which are not rationally acceptable. This is how things are from the
pragmatist point of view: the pragmatist thinks that the methods and aims of
inquiry are empirical discoveries, and not based on a priori conceptions of
rationality, reasons, evidence and the like. Yet, for the argument to succeed,
we must already accept the pragmatist view of how rationally acceptable or
justified solutions of value disputes can be achieved – something that not
everyone is likely to accept. The problem is all the more urgent when similar
premises are used to show that democratic use of state power is legitimate in
the sense of being acceptable to all citizens. In Talisse’s version, the pragma-
tist argument is deployed to circumvent the problem of founding democracy
on substantial ethical and political views that may be rejectable by some citi-
zens. However, even if this view of democracy is not centred on some com-
prehensive ethical view, to accept it we must still share a number of
assumptions concerning rationality, truth and the requirements of good
inquiry – in other words, a comprehensive epistemic view (cf. Rydenfelt
2011a; 2013).
Concentrating on the original issue of the connection between democracy
and the pragmatist view of inquiry, we might grant the first premise as well as
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its consequences for the empirical revisability of the standards of rationality
or justification. Perhaps the arguments at hand do not convince those who do
not share the pragmatist view of inquiry into ethical and political issues;
nevertheless, this is what the distinctively pragmatist view of democracy
maintains. Even then, however, the second premise of Putnam’s argument
faces a challenge. Putnam maintains that this premise is empirical. Is it really
obvious that experiences of inquiry – either in general, or into ethical issues in
particular – have led us to think that inquiry can only (or even best) be pur-
sued in a democratic setting? Putnam himself admits that sometimes full
“democratization” is not a prerequisite of scientific inquiry: such inquiry may
be conducted, for example, when a tyrant allows limited freedom of speech
among a group of physicists engaged in specific research (1994, 175). Yet one
might argue that this is the case of inquiry more generally. While it seems
clear that the advancement of science does depend on the availability of
information – at least of previous studies and empirical data – high quality
science has been performed in contexts which are by no means democratic.
Perhaps good science involves some elements of democratic governance, but it
seems hardly evident that its progress presupposes a democratic societal set-
ting. Why should things be any different in the case of inquiry into ethical
and political issues?
The role of citizens
The question arrived at concerns the role of citizens. Again, consider the
contrast between the pragmatist view and deliberative democracy. In the
latter view, citizens must be involved and included in public deliberation;
the test of the correctness, validity or legitimacy of political decisions is
that a consensus is reached among them. In the pragmatist view, delib-
eration and consensus has no such role; rather – at least in contemporary
accounts – it is argued that inquiry into ethical, political and societal
issues demands “democracy”. But how? What is the role of “ordinary”
citizens in such inquiry?
The answer that many contemporary pragmatists have supplied is that the
knowledge, particular perspective and experiences of any citizen may con-
tribute to the advancement of inquiry. Drawing mainly from Peirce but also
from Dewey, Cheryl Misak, as we saw, has pointed out that the experiences of
everyone may be relevant to ethical and political inquiry. Similarly, Elizabeth
Anderson (2006) has argued that Dewey’s experimentalist view of inquiry
entails the inclusion of citizens of diverse backgrounds, opinions and the like.
In Anderson’s view, the exclusion of some citizens would hinder the “ability of
collective decision-making to take advantage of citizens’ situated knowledge –
the fact that citizens from different walks of life have different experiences of
problems and policies of public interest, experiences that have evidential
import for devising and evaluating solutions”; in contrast, “[u]niversal inclu-
sion makes maximal use of such situated knowledge” (Anderson 2006, 34).
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James Bohman, in turn, has argued that the “epistemic benefits of democ-
racy”, in Dewey’s view, “derive from a practice of deliberation in which many
different perspectives are brought to bear in an ongoing process of formula-
tion, testing, and revision” (Bohman 2010, 53).2
While the idea of the potential benefits of drawing from the knowledge
accrued by large numbers of people (or citizens) is part of the connection
which Dewey made between democracy and social inquiry, as defences of the
relevance of the views of “ordinary” citizens these accounts suffer from ser-
ious problems. It is unclear – at least unless much more is said of the con-
tribution that citizens are expected to make – why the same information and
knowledge would not be possessed, or at least very easily acquired, by
experts. Indeed, these views of the role of citizens risk reducing the intelli-
gence operative in inquiry to the potential contribution of individual intel-
lects – that is, to the compound of individual knowledge – rather than viewing
that intelligence as encompassing the whole process of testing social policy.
That is, these views threaten to obfuscate the experimental nature of social
inquiry. For example, although Bohman lists different stages of the scrutiny of
a hypothesis – formulation, testing and revision – it appears that the (demo-
cratic) process of inquiry is still understood as the collection of information in
a conversation between different “perspectives” and the interests they include
in a process of deliberation. Such collection of information is needful to
identify the issues and problems at hand and to formulate initial ideas for
solutions. As Dewey had it, “fact-finding procedures are necessary for (1)
determination of problems and for (2) provision of data that indicate and test
hypotheses” (1938, 500). However, the ultimate test of a social policy is in its
observable consequences when put into action by means of experiment.
Indeed, rather than the relevance of individual contribution to knowledge,
it is the experimental nature of social inquiry that ultimately makes the
engagement of “ordinary” citizens needful. Unlike in physical science
advanced in the laboratory or observatory, the experiments of social inquiry
must be actionable in the actual association of actual people. Dewey went so
far as to say that this must a part of the very process of devising a hypothesis:
“Any hypothesis as to a social end must include as part of itself the idea of
organized association among those who are to execute the operations it for-
mulates and directs” (1938, 496). Moreover, attributing some bearing and
significance to the consequences of an experiment requires that those con-
sequences take place in human practice. The relevance and significance of
those consequences cannot be determined, Dewey maintained, except by
“active or ‘practical’ operations conducted according to an idea which is a
plan” (1938, 504). Social inquiry, then, would be impossible – at least in our
current conditions – without citizens both willing to engage in its practical
operations and organized, in groups and as a society, in a fashion that makes
experimentation with social policy possible.3 Social inquiry cannot begin
unless the required societal organization and the willingness to participate are
in place.
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What would this process of experimentation look like in practice? The
starting point of social inquiry is a problematic situation. Such inquiry must
begin with an attempt to identify societal problems, formulate them in an
accessible manner and devise hypotheses concerning possible solutions. This
part of the process is close to deliberation, wherein “ordinary” citizens can
participate and present their views of the problems they are facing, identify
shared problems and propose different ideas for possible solutions. However,
this is just one stage of social inquiry. After the problem has been identified
and hypotheses concerning its solution have been devised, the hypothesis – a
social policy – is then introduced to human practices. The role of citizens, at
this stage, is to engage in their everyday social practices affected by the new
policy. The outcomes generated are then assessed; for the collection of such
data, the input of citizens and their views of the outcomes and their relevance
are needful. The method of democracy involves not only discussion and
deliberation to identify problems and possible solutions, nor only an assess-
ment of results, but includes both as stages of the experimentation of policy
within human practices. Although the process itself can be expert-driven,
citizens’ participation is required for the success of the overall process of
inquiry: without their contribution at each stage, the inquiry could not be
conducted.
Accordingly, we can make some sense of Dewey’s proposal that democracy
should permeate every form of human association. This was not to imply that
we should decide everything by majority rule. The pragmatist view of
democracy is a relatively radical one; it is not wedded to many of the features
of contemporary Western societies with which we have grown accustomed to
identify democracy: certain institutions, representational forms of govern-
ment, voting, elections and so on. A successful implementation of the prag-
matist vision doubtless requires that some (aspects of) these institutions are in
place. Social inquiry would likely be stymied by an absence of free speech or
the kind of educational institutions which produce experts able to engage in
social inquiry, as well as citizens willing to engage in that process. However,
the traditional institutions of Western democracy may themselves be subject
to gradual revision in the search for better ways in which to devise and revise
social and societal policy.
Conclusion
The pragmatist perspective on democracy is distinct from élitist and delib-
erative views of democracy. Rather than citizen representation and voting or
participating in public deliberation, the starting point of the pragmatist per-
spective is a view of social inquiry into normative issues as a form of experi-
mental science. This “method” of democracy, however, requires an
articulation of the role of (ordinary) citizens: why is this inquiry not best
conducted by merely by experts? I have proposed that social inquiry involves
citizens participating in the improvement of social policy in terms of their
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everyday practices. It is this understanding of the connection between social
inquiry and actual, everyday social practices that gives content to the prag-
matist insistence that inquiry requires “democracy”. Ordinary citizens’
engagement in various stages of the experimental process is needful for its
success. Accordingly, if there is a pragmatist “justification” of democracy, it is
this: social inquiry requires more than experts. Fashioning democracy
through the lens of social inquiry means, however, that the pragmatists – like
Dewey – are unlikely to provide a detailed account of any fixed institutional
and constitutional requirements of democracy. In line with the processes of
any experimental line of inquiry, the specific methods of social inquiry are
always subject to revision.
Notes
1 This is not to say that the deliberative view is without its problems; indeed, it is
vulnerable to a relatively simple counterargument. Although deliberative democ-
racy is not founded on the (alleged) acceptance of some particular (first-order)
value, it nevertheless rests on a substantial conception of the correctness, justifica-
tion or legitimacy of ethical and political views as a product of a free, rational,
consensus-yielding discussion (cf. Rydenfelt 2013). This conception can be rejected
by some citizens, rendering the justification of democracy suspect at least from
some points of view. The same is the case with the more particular ideals and
practices that theorists have suggested are integral to the deliberative process, such
as the tolerance of pluralism of opinion and equality in making and criticizing
proposals for policy (cf. Cohen 1989).
2 This is where pragmatism also promises to bridge the gap between the consensus-
oriented, liberal view and the agonist version of democracy that opposes it. The
high bar of legitimacy set by the demand of acceptability to all citizens has been
extended to act as the basis of foundational democratic principles (Rawls), and a
rational consensus has been advanced as a criterion for the correctness of moral
and political views (Habermas, many deliberative theorists). According to critics
such as Chantal Mouffe (2013), such a view risks downplaying the conflict of views
that occurs in a democratic societal setting. By analogy with scientific inquiry, the
pragmatist can argue that democracy requires both moments of consensus and
conflict; while relative uniformity of opinion about some central aims and values is
needful to provide the starting points of such inquiry, diversity and pluralism of
opinion provides the impetus necessary for constant revision of even well entren-
ched views.
3 It should be noted that technological development – especially advances in simula-
tion and virtual reality – may eventually reduce the need to test social policies in
actual human practices. However, while computer simulations, for example, can be
deployed to test social policies against their desired ends-in-view, it is not at all clear
whether simulations can ultimately provide data sufficient for the testing of those
ends themselves.
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